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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered 
by The District Court of Salt Lake County upon motions to 
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dismiss filed by this defendant and similar motions by the 
other defendants. 
The complaint contains two causes of action. The first 
cause of action attacks the sale by the defendant city to de-
fendant Chamber of Commerce of the property presently 
housing the police and fire departments of defendant city, 
located at First South and State Streets in Salt Lake City. 
This property is to be, in turn, conveyed to the United States 
for a site for a federal office building. Insofar as this de-
fendant is concerned it is alleged that this defendant has no 
right to use what plaintiff calls a trust fund to assist in the 
acquisition of the property for a federal building site. The 
plaintiff claims such plan is null and void as to this defendant 
for six separate reasons. We shall discuss these in our argument. 
No where in the complaint is there any attempt to de-
fine the so called trust fund, the purposes of the trust, the 
limitations of the trust or the rights of beneficiaries in the 
trust. It is simply alleged defendant was incorporated as a 
corporation sole with the right to acquire, hold, dispose of 
such real and personal property as may be conveyed to or 
acquired by it for the benefit of the members of the Church 
for the benefit of religion, works of charity and for the pur-
pose of worship. 
In the second cause of action the plaintiff attacks the 
sale by Salt Lake City of the Forest Dale Golf Course to this 
defendant. The sale is alleged to be void solely because all of 
the members of the city commission were members of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Church, and so were disqualified to partici-
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pate in the sale and because the city did not proceed with the 
sale in the proper manner. There are no allegations involving 
this defendant in any unauthorized activity. 
In the first cause of action plaintiff alleges he was once 
a member of the Church and had once paid tithing and had 
made contributions to the Church. At the hearing on the 
motions in the lower court and in his written brief, plaintiff 
conceded that he was not a member of the Church and that 
he had no standing to question the use of the funds of the 
Church. In an attempt to overcome the fatal defect of having 
a plaintiff who had no interest in the so called trust fund of 
this defendant, and so had no status to question the use to be 
made of the same, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion on 
behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Fausett to intervene. Their complaint 
in intervention alleged they were members of the Church and 
had paid tithes and other contributions to the Church. They 
adopted the allegations of the original complaint. Any fur-
ther analysis of the complaint that may be necessary will be 
made in the course of our argument to avoid repetition. 
This defendant relies upon the following points for an 
affirmance of the judgment of dismissal by the lower court: 
P O I N T O N E 
PLAINTIFF, N O T BEING A MEMBER OF T H E 
C H U R C H , HAS N O INTEREST IN T H E C H U R C H 
PROPERTY A N D HAS N O STANDING IN C O U R T 
T O QUESTION T H E USE MADE OF C H U R C H FUNDS, 
A N D FOR THIS REASON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE 
OF ACTION FAILS T O STATE A CLAIM UPON 
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WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT TWO 
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE 
A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AS IT FAILS 
TO ALLEGE: (a) THAT ONLY TRUST FUNDS ARE 
AVAILABLE AND WILL NECESSARILY BE USED TO 
PURCHASE THE FIRST SOUTH PROPERTY; AND 
(b) THE NATURE OF THE TRUST UNDER WHICH 
THE FUNDS OF THIS DEFENDANT ARE CLAIMED 
TO BE HELD IN TRUST, THE PURPOSE OF THE 
TRUST OR WHEREIN THE CONTEMPLATED 
TRANSACTION WILL VIOLATE THE TRUST AS SO 
DEFINED. 
POINT THREE 
PARAGRAPH 20 OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION ATTEMPTS TO ALLEGE WHEREIN THE 
TRANSACTION COMPLAINED OF IS NULL AND 
VOID AS TO THIS DEFENDANT, BUT SUCH ALLE-
GATIONS FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE HAD AGAINST THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT FOUR 
SINCE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE 
CHURCH, AND SO HAS NO STATUS TO QUESTION 
THE USE PROPOSED TO BE MADE OF CHURCH 
FUNDS, THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS LIMITED 
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TO A SUIT BY A TAXPAYER TO RESTRAIN A SALE 
OF CITY PROPERTY AND FAILS TO STATE FACTS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CLAIM UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT FIVE 
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR GENERAL 
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES CREATE NO TRUST OR 
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE PERSON CON-
TRIBUTING. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE MOTION OF LYNN 
AND FIAMETTA FAUSETT TO INTERVENE IN THIS 
ACTION. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE 
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A DISREGARD 
OF THE SEPARATE CORPORATE ENTITY OF ZIONS 
SECURITIES CORPORATION AND TO MAKE THIS 
DEFENDANT ITS ALTER EGO AS A MATTER OF 
LAW OR FACT. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION BECAUSE IT FAILS TO ALLEGE FACTS SUF-
FICIENT TO SHOW A BREACH OF TRUST. 
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POINT NINE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIS-
MISSING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO 
THIS DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF, NOT BEING A MEMBER OF THE 
CHURCH, HAS NO INTEREST IN THE CHURCH 
PROPERTY AND HAS NO STANDING IN COURT 
TO QUESTION THE USE MADE OF CHURCH FUNDS, 
AND FOR THIS REASON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE 
OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
There are numerous cases which hold that a person who 
has left the Church, or has been excommunicated, has no 
status to question the use being made of Church funds or 
property, nor can he stand for or represent those who are 
members. On this point we cite the following: 
NANCE V. BUSBY, 91 Tenn 303,14 LRA 801,18 SW 
874. Here property was conveyed to the Baptist Church with 
a specific trust to be devoted to a specific and definite faith 
and order. Plaintiffs, suing on behalf of themselves and mem-
bers of the Church, charged that the property so conveyed 
was being used to teach principles contrary to the established 
order. The court says: 
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"There may be persons associated with them 
(plaintiff) in sympathy and interest, who are not 
expelled members of the church, but, if this is so, 
complainants cannot stand for or represent such per-
sons. Excommunicated members, whose names have 
been by the valid action of the church expunged from 
the roll of members, cannot stand for and represent 
members. They are not of the same class." 
"Not being members of this church, they are not 
beneficiaries under the conveyance by which the 
church holds its church. They have, therefore, no 
status as enables them to question the use of the prop-
erty by the defendants. The result is that notwith-
standing the force and effect of the verdict, the 
chancellor should have dismissed the bill." 
This case is followed in KITTINGER V. CHURCHILL, 
292 NYS 35, 51, the court holding that voluntary contribu-
tions are not impressed with any trust, express or implied. 
The case of Kittinger v. Churchill is followed in 
GETHESEMANE LUTHERAN C H U R C H V. ZACHO, 
92 N W 2d 905, which quotes therefrom as follows: 
"The usual rule applicable to religious societies is 
that the rights of a member are dependent on the con-
tinuance of his membership and when he ceases to be 
a member his rights and beneficial interest in the 
society's property ceases, and he no longer has stand-
ing to sue in relation thereto. Nor does the fact that 
plaintiff may have made contributions to this associa-
tion give him any right after his withdrawal to sue in 
relation to its affairs." 
STEWART V. JARRIEL, 59 SE 2d 368, 206 Ga. 855. 
The court said: 
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"An expelled member of a church has no interest 
in the church property, and excommunicated mem-
bers whose names have been expunged from the 
church membership roll by the valid action of the 
church cannot stand for and represent members of the 
church in an action to prevent the diversion of church 
property from its lawful uses." 
RODGERS V. BERNETT, 65 SW 410 and PARTIN 
V. TUCKER 172 So. 89. These cases cite and quote with ap-
proval from N A N C E V. BUSBY, SUPRA. 
THOMAS V. LEWIS 224 KY 307, 65 SW 2d 255. The 
court says: 
"If the congregation has irregularly removed 
officers, excluded members, diverted funds, or been 
guilty of any other irregularity, the correction of such 
abuses rests with the body of membership of the 
church.' 
See also APOSTOLIC HOLINESS U N I O N V. K N U D -
SEN 123 P 4 7 3 . 
From the foregoing authorities it is clear that plaintiff, 
not being a member of the Church, has no right or standing 
to question the right or authority of this defendant or Zions 
Securities Corporation to use funds to acquire a site to be sold 
to the Federal Government for a federal building site, or to 
represent members of the Church in such action. Conse-
quently, the first cause of action fails to state a claim upon 
which any relief can be granted against this defendant. 
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POINT TWO 
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE 
A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AS IT FAILS 
TO ALLEGE: (a) THAT ONLY TRUST FUNDS ARE 
AVAILABLE AND WILL NECESSARILY BE USED TO 
PURCHASE THE FIRST SOUTH PROPERTY; AND 
(b) THE NATURE OF THE TRUST UNDER WHICH 
THE FUNDS OF THIS DEFENDANT ARE CLAIMED 
TO BE HELD IN TRUST, THE PURPOSE OF THE 
TRUST OR WHEREIN THE CONTEMPLATED 
TRANSACTION WILL VIOLATE THE TRUST AS SO 
DEFINED. 
(a) It is alleged that Zions Securities Corporation, here-
inafter called Zions, is a corporation organized under the 
laws of the State of Utah, all its capital stock, except to 
qualify directors, being owned by this defendant. There is no 
allegation that Zions may not, under its articles of incorpo-
ration, engage in the ordinary commercial transactions. Nor 
are there any allegations to the effect that the only assets of, 
and only funds available to, Zions are trust res, or res im-
pressed with a limitation of any kind. Nor are there any alle-
gations that the only funds available to Zions in connection 
with the transaction under consideration must of necessity 
come from trust funds held by Corporation of the President. 
It is not to be presumed that Zions can not hold or dis-
burse money in the ordinary commercial sense. It is a cor-
poration organized for profit under the laws of Utah. In the 
absence of any allegation to the effect that by its articles of 
incorporation it can only hold and disburse trust funds, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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inference must surely prevail that it holds and uses its prop-
erty and funds in the ordinary commercial sense, the same as 
any other corporation organized for profit. 
There being no allegation as above indicated the com-
plaint fails to state a cause of action, for without such alle-
gations there can be no basis upon which to restrain Zions, or 
this defendant, from purchasing or providing funds with 
which the Chamber of Commerce will purchase the property 
from the city. Plaintiff is a stranger both to Zions and this 
defendant. He owns no stock in Zions and he has no con-
nection with this defendant. He has no standing to question 
the right of either to assist in the acquisition of a site for a 
federal building. 
(b) As heretofore pointed out, nowhere in the com-
plaint is there any attempt to define the so called trust fund, 
the purpose of the trust, the limitation of the trust, or the 
rights of beneficiaries in the trust. All that is alleged is that 
this defendant has a trust fund. 
There is no allegation that the donors, in making their 
contributions to the Church, by tithes or otherwise, imposed 
any trust terms. There are no allegations that such tithes or 
contributions were donated to this defendant. The fact is 
they were not. They were contributed to the Church as such. 
This defendant being merely a legal instrument to hold title 
to such property as may come to it. 
This defendant as a corporation and the Church as an 
unincorporated religious society are two separate and distinct 
entities. In HUNDLEY V. COLLINS, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So. 
575, the court says: 
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"These provisions of the Code for incorporation 
of churches or religious societies, and all powers con-
ferred thereunder, relate alone to their properties or 
temporalities, and have no reference to churches or 
societies as such, which bodies, as spiritual or ecclesi-
astical organizations, exist independent of their 
charters. A church or religious society may exist for 
all the purposes for which it was organized independ-
ently of any incorporation of the body under the 
statutes of the state. 
"Wherever there is an incorporated church, there 
are two entities, the one the church as such, not owing 
its ecclesiastical or spiritual existence to the civil law, 
and the legal corporation, each separate though closely 
allied. . . . The foregoing is quite sufficient to show 
that the spiritual entity called a church, made up of 
members belonging to it, existing without any special 
law to that effect, is a different and distinct body in 
the contemplation of law, from the same body when 
incorporated under the statutes for the purpose—the 
two having different functions to perform the one 
religious and the other civil . . . 'The two bodies, viz: 
the corporation and the church, although one may 
exist within the pale of the other, are in no respect 
correlative. The objects and interest of one are moral 
and spiritual; the other deals with things purely 
temporal and material/ " 
It is necessary to look to Church polity, rather than to 
this defendant's articles of incorporation to determine the 
nature and terms of any trust, if any trust exists. This is 
clearly illustrated in the case of BENDEWALD V. LEY, 39 
N .D. 272, 168 N ¥ 693, where the court sustained a general 
demurrer to the complaint, saying: 
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"The complaint contains no allegations of the 
ultimate facts, upon which the decision of the case 
upon its merits must be based. The complaint is wholly 
devoid of allegations as to church polity except as the 
constitution affords an indication of its principles of 
government, and without allegations supplementing 
the constitution in this particular and without evidence 
in support of such allegations, it cannot be determined 
ultimately whether or not the defendants have ex-
ceeded the powers vested in them as executive officers 
and members of the congregation. A plaintiff in an 
action of this character should not leave open to con-
jecture the matter of the minority right upon which 
the claim to relief is based." 
The case of WATSON V. JONES, 13 Wall 679, 20 
LEd 666, classifies the cases before the courts involving con-
troversies over church property into three classes: 
1. Property held under the terms of an express trust. 
2. Property held by a religious congregation which by 
the nature of its organization is strictly independ-
ent of other ecclesiastical associations and so far as 
church government is concerned owes no fealty or 
obligation to any higher authority. 
3. Property held by a religious congregation which in 
turn is a subordinate member of some general or-
ganization in which there are superior ecclesiastical 
tribunals having control. 
It is obvious that the instant case involves the second 
classification. The court held that under this classification the 
property is not held under a specific trust or for a trust that 
can be controlled by a minority, or that may not be used for 
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such purposes as the majority, or the officers in whom have 
been invested the power of control, may determine even 
though they have in some respects changed their religious 
views. 
Certainly the courts should not attempt to intrude into 
the manner in which a religious body may use its funds upon 
such scant and inadequate allegations as are contained in 
plaintiff's complaint. This would be real interference by the 
state into matters of religion. If a church member wants to 
have a civil court pass upon the polity of his church, the least 
that should be required is that he definitely alleged the facts 
upon which he claims a right to relief. Especially should this 
be true when he seeks to invoke the extraordinary power of 
injunction to restrain the Church in its activities. 
POINT THREE 
PARAGRAPH 20 OF T H E FIRST CAUSE OF AC-
T I O N ATTEMPTS T O ALLEGE WHEREIN T H E 
TRANSACTION COMPLAINED OF IS NULL A N D 
VOID AS T O THIS DEFENDANT, BUT SUCH ALLE-
GATIONS FAIL T O STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
UPON W H I C H RELIEF CAN BE H A D AGAINST THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
(a) Paragraph (a) recites that since this defendant, 
through Zions, already has a federal building site at the 
Lafayette School site, it is estopped to acquire another site, 
the First South Site. This objection is wholly specious and 
frivolous. It is predicated on the proposition that since there 
is only one federal building in contemplation, ipso facto, 
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there can not be two sites, hence one having been acquired by 
Zions, but not by the government, Zions may not obtain 
another in the hope that the second will be acceptable to the 
government in place of the first. The final decision in the 
matter is with the federal government. If it chooses to ac-
quire the Lafayette site the First South site will not be used. 
If it chooses the First South site the Lafayette site will not be 
used. 
In his complaint, Paragraph 11 and 12, first cause, 
plaintiff alleges that an action is pending to declare the 
acquisition of the Lafayette site illegal. If this proves correct 
there cannot be an estoppel to acquire the First South site. To 
claim an estoppel plaintiff must take a position contrary to 
that of his counsel, Mr. Musser, who brought the action to 
set aside the acquisition of the Lafayette site because certain 
members of the school board voting for the sale of that site to 
Zions were disqualified because of conflicting interests. Are 
plaintiff and his counsel trying to blow hot and cold? 
Further, the plaintiff is in no position and has no status 
to plead an estoppel. The elements of an estoppel are not 
present. 
19 AM. Jur. Page 732. Section 34: 
"Not only must the party claiming an estoppel 
have believed and relied upon the words or conduct of 
the other party, but also he must have been thereby 
induced to act, or to refrain from acting, in such a 
manner and to such an extent as to change his po-
sition or status from that which he would otherwise 
have occupied." 
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Section 35, Page 735: 
"Estoppel rests largely upon injury or prejudice 
to the rights of him who asserts it. Since the function 
and purpose of the doctrine are the prevention of 
fraud or injustice, there can be no estoppel where 
there is no loss, injury, damage, or prejudice to the 
party claiming it." 
(b) Here plaintiff asserts this defendant and Zions have 
no right to use trust funds to pay for a site for a federal 
building. This point is covered by what has already been 
written and further discussion yet to be made. 
(c) and (d) In paragraph 20 (c) and (d) plaintiff is 
complaining against the right and authority of the two church 
corporations to do the things alleged. In other words, plaintiff 
claims these corporations are exercising a franchise or privilege 
not conferred upon them by law. This is an attack in the 
nature of a quo warranto proceeding and comes under Rule 
65B (b) 1. Rule 65B (c) requires the action be brought by 
the Attorney General in the name of the state. Rule 65B (d) 
permits a private person to bring the action only if the 
attorney general fails to do so after notice. It also requires the 
person to file an undertaking, upon filing the complaint, to 
pay any judgment for costs or damages recovered against him 
in such action. There is no allegations that notice has been 
given the attorney general to bring the action to test the 
right of these corporations to do the things complained of, 
nor has any bond been filed. Further, plaintiff does not show 
a special interest in the matters complained of. 
STATE V. RYAN, 41 Utah 327, 125 P 666. Here the 
court held that a person could not bring quo warranto to 
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test the sufficiency of the organization of a high school dis-
trict, showing no other interest than a resident and taxpayer 
in the district. Such an interest was common to all. He must 
have a special interest in the matter and the Attorney Gen-
eral must have refused to bring the action. 
PEOPLE EX REL BYERS V. G R A N D RIVER 
BRIDGE COMPANY, 13 Colo. 11, 21 P 898. Plaintiff 
brought suit to dissolve defendant corporation, alleging the 
district attorney refused to bring the action. He was not a 
stockholder and had no interest in the corporation other than 
the corporation had appropriated some of his land on the 
river bank on which to rest its bridge. The court says: 
"If the defendant corporation has violated the 
law, either by doing some forbidden act or by neglect-
ing to do some act enjoined upon it, it is not every 
person who may call it to account for such violation. 
As a general rule, prosecutions for wrong done to the 
public must be instituted by the state through its prop-
erly authorized agents, while the individual can only 
sue for injuries peculiarly affecting him, and the pro-
vision of the code permitting an action in the nature 
of a quo warranto to be brought by a purely private 
party, upon the neglect or refusal of the district attor-
ney to bring such action, must be construed with 
reference to this general rule." 
PEOPLE V. BLEECKER ST. & F.F.R. CO. 125 NYS 
1045, aff. 95 NE 1136, 201 N Y 594. Action by the people to 
have certain parts of a special franchise to operate a street 
railway on streets of Manhattan forfeited and annulled be-
cause unlawfully held. On the matter of quo warranto the 
court says: 
i 
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"At common law equity did not have jurisdiction 
in an action for relief such as that here demanded, but 
the Attorney General was vested with authority to 
maintain quo warranto for such relief at common law. 
The legislature, in abolishing the writ of quo war-
ranto, did not intend to deprive the court of juris-
diction in cases of this kind. It was merely intended to 
change the form of procedure, and that relief which 
formerly was obtained by quo warranto and by scire 
facias, should be had in actions or by motions as pre-
scribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. We should 
expect, therefore, to find by some appropriate pro-
vision of the Code of Civil Procedure authority con-
ferred on the Attorney General to maintain such an 
action, and we think it was conferred by sec. 1948, 
subdivision 1: 'The Attorney General may maintain 
an action, upon his own information, or upon the 
complaint of a private person, in either of the follow-
ing causes: (1) Against a person who usurpos, intrudes 
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises within the state 
a franchise, or a public office, civil or military, or an 
office of a domestic corporation/ " 
The court held the word "person" in this section applied 
to a corporation, as the term "person" includes a corporation. 
This case was followed and quoted from in STATE V. 
BURMINGHAM WATERWORKS COMPANY, 185 Ala. 
388, 64 So. 23, A N N CAS 1916 B 166. 
51 CJpage 339, Sec. 47. 
"Ordinarily a quo warranto proceeding to oust 
individual from exercising franchises and privileges of 
a corporation without authority of law, to forfeit the 
charter of a private corporation or to oust it from ex-
ercise of the powers or franchises not conferred by 
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law, may and should, be instituted by the attorney 
general or other appropriate officer, ex officio on 
behalf of the state, and not by a private citizen or 
relator who has no interest in the corporation." 
The same is found in 74 CJS Page 229, Sec. 30 (2 ) . 
7 4 C J S Page 222, Sec. 28: 
"Under the statutes of a number of jurisdictions, 
the institution of a quo warranto proceeding by a 
private citizen is authorized. Regardless of the vari-
ance in their language the statutes are generally con-
strued not to authorize the institution or maintenance 
of a quo warranto proceeding by a private person 
unless, according to the decisions, he has a special or 
personal or peculiar interest which is distinct from 
that of the public." 
(e) In this paragraph the plaintiff alleges that the pur-
chase of the First South site will violate the provisions of 
Section 4, Articles 1 of the Utah Constitution which provides 
there shall be no union of church and state and shall not 
dominate the state or interfere with its functions. The ques-
tion to be resolved is: wherein would the purchase by the 
federal government of a site for a federal building from this 
defendant or Zions violate this provision? 
The term "state" must refer to the State of Utah. Cer-
tainly Utah was not legislating for the U.S. or for any of its 
states, except for itself. The text of the section shows this. If 
there is any union or domination or interference in this trans-
action it does not affect the State of Utah, as it is not acquir-
ing the site and will not be affected by the transaction here 
involved. 
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To violate these provisions there must be shown some-
thing in the nature of a hazard tending toward breaking 
down the separation of the church and state. In EWING V. 
HARRIES, 68 Utah 452, 250 P 1049, where the election of 
Harries as sheriff was challenged on the ground that church 
officials had urged the church members to unite and elect 
Harries, which action, it was charged, constituted a violation 
of sec. 4, Art. I, the court says: 
"It is pertinent to ask in what way, if at all, does 
the fact, if it be a fact, that a large number of church 
members unite or join their efforts in bringing about 
the election of a particular person to a particular 
office, in this case County Sheriff, dominate the state 
or interfere with its functions? The state itself is not 
concerned whether A or B is elected to a particular 
office; but the people may be greatly interested. It is 
not the function of the state either to nominate or to 
choose candidates. This is purely a political question 
entrusted to the people while acting in their political 
capacity as electors." 
Likewise, the state is not concerned in the selection by 
the federal government of a site on which to erect a federal 
building. It is not the function of the state to select or to 
control the selection of such site. That is the matter solely for 
the federal government. 
THOMAS V. DAUGHTERS OF U T A H PIONEERS, 
197 P2d 477. The court held that appropriation of 
$150,000.00 by the state for erecting a Pioneer Memorial 
Building to be under the auspices of the Daughters of the 
Utah Pioneers did not violate this constitutional provision. 
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After reviewing the facts and history leading to the enact-
ment by the legislature the court asks: 
"Is the picture now submitted to us one that 
evidences a potential hazard in the nature of a step 
toward breaking down that separation of church and 
state." 
We also ask the same question. 
(f) Here plaintiff pleads the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Section 7, 
Article 1, Utah Constitution. We submit that these constitu-
tional provisions have not the slightest application in the case 
now before the court, due process having been defined by this 
court in RIGGINS V. DISTRICT C O U R T OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, 89 Utah 183, 57 P2d 645 as follows: 
"Due process of law requires that notice be 
given to the person whose rights are affected. It hears 
before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry and renders 
judgment only after trial." 
How is plaintiff being deprived of due process? He has 
no interest in the so-called trust funds. He alleges the funds 
are held for the benefit of the members of the church and 
that he is not a member. What notice or process has he failed 
to receive? The principals to this transaction are not com-
plaining about want of due process. 
Next he invokes the constitutional provision against tak-
ing private property for public use without just compensa-
tion. Whose property is being taken and who is taking it? The 
Federal Government is not taking any of plaintiff's property 
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nor are the two church corporations. There is no element of 
taking involved. There is a sale which will have to be on terms 
agreeable to both buyer and seller. 
TANNER V. PROVO BENCH CANAL AND IRRI-
GATION COMPANY 40 Utah 105, 121 P 534. The court 
held: 
"The burden of showing the damage which the 
owner will suffer rests on him." 
Here the plaintiff sought to enlarge a canal and the 
owner of the canal easement sought right to compensation. 
The court held that he had not shown any damages and 
therefore could not complain. 
EDEN IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. DISTRICT 
COURT WEBER COUNTY, 61 Utah 103, 211 P 957. Here 
it was held that a water user may not object to an act of 
legislature which empowers the State Engineer to adjudicate 
waste water. No one has a vested right in waste water. Hence, 
no one is deprived of any right when required not to waste 
water. 
POINT FOUR 
SINCE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE 
CHURCH, AND SO HAS NO STATUS TO QUESTION 
THE USE PROPOSED TO BE MADE OF CHURCH 
FUNDS, THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS LIMITED 
TO A SUIT BY A TAXPAYER TO RESTRAIN A SALE 
OF CITY PROPERTY AND FAILS TO STATE FACTS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CLAIM UPON 
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W H I C H RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
Since it is conceded that plaintiff is not a member of the 
Church and has no standing in court to question use of 
Church funds this at once eliminates all issues in relation to 
that feature of the case. All that is left of the first cause of 
action is an attack by a taxpayer upon the action of the city 
in selling or agreeing to sell the First South property. This 
being true there is no cause of action alleged against this de-
fendant. 
If this defendant is to be retained as a defendant at all 
it would only be on the remote, indirect, intangible interest 
that might be involved in the city being restrained from sell-
ing its property to be used as a federal building site. The first 
cause of action clearly fails to allege any pecuniary or prop-
erty interest on the part of this defendant in the transaction 
that would be affected by restraining the city from selling. 
All that is alleged is that the "purported bid made by Gus P. 
Backman was so made at the solicitation of the defendant, 
Corporation of the President, and its agent and owned de-
fendant, Zions Securities Corporation." Whoever takes title 
from the city is a mere conduit through which title will pass 
to Federal Service Administration. N o beneficial interest will 
be acquired by such grantee. The conveyance can be made 
directly to the Federal Service Administration without in-
vading any rights of this defendant. 
The situation covered by the plaintiff's allegations is the 
same as if I were to become interested in seeing that " A " ob-
tained a certain site for a home. I solicit " B " to submit a bid 
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to the seller to purchase the home and "BM in turn would see 
that " A " obtained the property for his home, or that the 
property was deeded directly to "A." I would not be a 
proper or necessary party to an action brought by " C " 
against the seller to prevent the sale nor would I have such an 
interest as would permit me to intervene in such action. Such 
a transaction would not give me any interest in the property. 
I would be a mere volunteer, pure and simple. All that could 
happen to me, if the seller were restrained, would be the per-
sonal disappointment arising from the fact that " A " did not 
get the home site involved. N o property right of mine would 
be invaded or affected. 
P O I N T FIVE 
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR GENERAL 
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES CREATE N O TRUST OR 
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN T H E PERSON C O N -
TRIBUTING. 
As heretofore pointed out, there are no allegations in 
the complaint which explain or define the manner in which 
funds are received by the Church. Tithes and contributions 
are mentioned, both of which constitute voluntary contri-
butions. There are no allegations that these are made by 
Church members with any specific restrictions as to the ap-
plication or use to be made of them. 
In CADMAN MEMORIAL CONGREGATIONAL 
SOCIETY V. KENYON, 306 N Y 151, 116 NE 2d 481, 
affirming 111 NYS 2d 808, the court says: 
"Gifts to religious or charitable corporations to 
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aid in carrying out the purposes for which they are 
organized, either by expending the principal of a be-
quest or the income of a bequest to be invested in per-
petuity, does not create a trust in any legal sense." 
It was pointed out in the decision in 111 NYS 2d 808, 
which decision was affirmed by the case above referred to, 
that if the religious body attempts to violate the charter 
powers the donors may protect themselves through an action 
by the attorney general to compel use of the funds for the 
purposes for which they were given. 
CLARK V. SISTERS OF SOCIETY OF T H E HOLY 
CHILD JESUS, 117 N ¥ 107. The court held: 
"The general rule appears to be that, where 
property is conveyed directly to a corporation to hold 
for purposes for which the corporation was created, 
no trust for the benefit of others arises. 
"We are unable to see any legal principle upon 
which a charitable trust in this property can be estab-
lished, and if no trust was created by the deed of con-
veyance, the plaintiffs in this action have no interest 
which qualifies them to maintain the action." 
IN RE HENRIKSON'S ESTATE, 203 N ¥ 778 
(MINN.) 
Decedent devised the residue of his estate to the Swedish 
Baptist General Conference in Sweden, the property to be 
reduced to cash and invested, the income to be used to pay the 
salary of a Baptist Minister in certain areas in Sweden, the 
principal not to be used to pay salaries. The court held: 
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"The bequest being to an entity having capacity 
to take and administer the same under the Laws of 
Sweden, it is not necessary to determine whether under 
our laws a void or illegal trust was attempted. But, the 
bequest being for missionary or charitable purposes to 
an organization created to carry out such purposes 
may be upheld under our statute as a bequest absolute 
to the agency as a gift upon condition. 
"If the bequest in this case had been made to a 
corporation organized for the purpose for which the 
gifts were made, the education of a young men for the 
priesthood, the corporation would take the bequest 
absolutely, as the beneficiary, and not in trust." 
Also IN RE HAVSGAARD'S ESTATE, 283 N ¥ 130, 
the court says: 
"A gift to a corporation or organization to en-
able it to carry out some or all the purposes for which 
it was formed does not create a trust." 
Quoting from page on Wills, 2d ed., Volume 2, Sec. 
1049, Second Edition and citing a number of cases. 
The court goes on to use this language: 
"The rule above announced has had a general ap-
plication. The reason underlying the rule being that 
the purpose for which the property is left, being a 
part of the church and a department of the church it-
self, that both the legal and equitable title vests in the 
church and this being true the equitable title merges 
in the legal title. A person cannot be a trustee for him-
self." 
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ZABEL V. STEWART, 109 P 2d 177, Kansas; the 
court says: 
"Generally it has been held that where a gift is 
given to a corporation for the accomplishment of a 
purpose for which the corporation was formed, the 
gift is absolute and not in trust, and more specifically, 
where a gift is made to a religious or charitable corpo-
ration to aid in carrying out the purposes for which it 
was formed, it does not create a trust in any legal sense 
and it is not to be judged by any of the well-known 
rules pertaining to the Law of Trusts as applied to 
individuals." 
P O I N T SIX 
T H E TRIAL C O U R T COMMITTED N O ERROR 
IN REFUSING T O G R A N T T H E MOTION OF L Y N N 
A N D FIAMETTA FAUSETT T O INTERVENE IN THIS 
ACTION. 
Appellant Stone argues that the Court erred in refusing 
to grant the motion of the Fausetts to intervene in this action. 
He is in no position to urge such error, if there is any error. 
I t was not his motion. His right of action, if any, stands or 
falls upon his complaint, not upon the complaint in inter-
vention. I t may be comforting to have company in his anti-
church crusade but he has no legal basis to assert error because 
the court failed to give him such companionship. Nowhere 
in the Appellant's brief is there any assertion of error on part 
of the Fausetts. Perhaps, since the trial court simply did not 
pass upon the motion to intervene, as there would be no cause 
of action in which to intervene when plaintiff's complaint 
was dismissed, there was no appealable judgment or order 
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from which the Fausetts could appeal. But this would not in-
vest plaintiff with the right to substitute himself for the 
Fausetts to urge error. 
In addition, neither plaintiff nor intervenors come 
within Rule 24 (a) (2 ) , as a matter of right, or 24 (b) as a 
matter of discretion. 
(a) To qualify for intervention as a matter of right, 
intervenor must come within this language of said rule: 
"When representation of the applicant's interest 
by an existing party is or may be inadequate and the 
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action." 
The only area in which intervenors are not adequately 
represented by Stone in this action, is that involving use of 
the Church's so-called trust fund, as alleged. Intervenors can 
not add anything to Stone's interest as a tax payer and resi-
dent of Salt Lake City. They all have the same attorneys. 
Since Stone has no status to question the use of the trust fund, 
to allow Fausett to intervene would be the equivalent of 
bringing a new action upon an entirely new issue, wholly for-
eign to the issues in the pending action. The plaintiff, as a 
tax payer, is contesting the sale of City property. Intervenors 
seek to prevent the Church from using its funds in making 
the purchase, an entirely different and indirect approach to 
an effort to enjoin the sale. 
Furthermore, intervenors will not be bound by the 
judgment dismissing the tax payer's suit. He can still test the 
trust fund theory by separate action. 
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2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, Section 597, p. 213: 
"Intervention as of right is not allowed, regard-
less of adequate representation, if the judgment could 
not conclude the intervenors." 
To the same effect is AR-TIK SYSTEMS, INC., V. 
DAIRY QUEEN 22 FRD 122 and SUTPHEN ESTATES 
V. UNITED STATES, 342 US 19 LEd, holding the decree 
or judgment must be res judicata of the rights sought to be 
protected by intervention. 
(b) To qualify for permissive intervention, intervenors 
must show their claim and the main action have a question of 
law or fact in common. Intervenors do not come within this 
rule. The only reason for their intervention is to have a plain-
tiff who is a member of the Church to question the use of the 
trust fund. Stone has no standing to question such use and no 
question either of law or fact in that regard could be raised 
by him. To permit Fausett to intervene would be the equiva-
lent of bringing in a new cause of action based upon issues of 
law and fact not involved in the main action. This may not 
be done, see STRICKLER ENGINEERING CORP. V. 
MICHAEL FLINN MFG. CO., 23 FRD 12. 
In WILSON V. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD, 
21 FRD 588, the Labor Union sought to intervene in an 
action by a re-employed veteran who alleged the defendant 
had failed to restore him to employment with full seniority. 
Intervenor claimed the bargaining agreement between it and 
the railroad was involved and might be interpreted adversely 
to employees. The Court refused intervention, saying: 
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"The pleadings of the original parties raise no 
issues pertaining to the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the federation and the defendant. 
Additional parties always take additional time. Even 
if they have no witnesses of their own, they are the 
source of additional questions, objections, briefs, argu-
ments, motions and the like, which tend to make the 
proceedings a Donnybrook Fair." 
4 Moore Federal Practice p. 67: 
"Interventions may be denied where the inter-
venor has an adequate remedy in another pending 
action or otherwise." 
P O I N T SEVEN 
T H E FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS T O STATE 
FACTS SUFFICIENT T O W A R R A N T A DISREGARD 
OF T H E SEPARATE CORPORATE ENTITY OF ZIONS 
SECURITIES CORPORATION A N D T O MAKE THIS 
DEFENDANT ITS ALTER EGO AS A MATTER OF 
LAW OR FACT. 
Plaintiffs seek, by the general allegation that this de-
fendant owns all of the capital stock of Zions, and that Zions 
is the agent of this defendant, to fuse the two corporate en-
tities in this defendant and to disregard the corporate entity 
and powers of Zions. We assert that such general allegations 
are wholly insufficient to sustain such a conclusion. 
13 AM. JUR., Section 6, Page 159: 
"The corporate entity is distinct although all its 
stock is owned by a single individual or corporation. 
Consequently, such concentration of stock ownership 
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does not alter the fact that title to the corporate prop-
erty is vested in the corporation and not in the owner 
of the corporate stock. Likewise, the fact that the 
stockholders or officers in two corporations may be 
the same does not operate to destroy the legal identity 
of either corporation. Moreover, the fact that one 
corporation exercises a controlling influence over the 
other through the ownership of its stock or through 
the identity of stockholders does not make either the 
agent of the other, or merge the two corporations 
into one." 
1 FLETCHER CYC. CORPORATIONS, Permanent 
Edition, Page 158-160, Section 43: 
"I t is not enough that the shareholders and offi-
cers or managers in the corporations are identical, and 
the mere fact that one owns all the stock of the other, 
or substantially all, is not enough to warrant disregard. 
Common officers and management is not incompat-
ible with separate entities, or conclusive of identity. 
Even active management for a proper object does not 
always indicate identical entities. . . . A difference in 
corporate powers, the held corporation having power 
to do that which is beyond the powers of the other, is 
an obstacle to the complete disregard of the former's 
entity." 
SURGICAL SUPPLY CENTER V. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 118 Utah 632, 223 P 2d 593. The court says: 
"Plaintiffs contend that the partnership owns all 
of the stock of the two corporations with the excep-
tion of five qualifying shares; that these corporations 
were organized merely to establish operating mediums 
of the two businesses of the partnership, and hence, 
the partnership, for the purposes of this statute should 
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continue to be regarded as the employer and the new 
companies should be entitled to the rate it has earned. 
In advancing this argument plaintiffs overlook well 
established principles of law relating to corporations. 
A corporation is a statutory entity which is regarded 
as having an existence and personality distinct from 
that of its members or stockholders. This is so even 
though the stock is owned by a single individual or 
different corporations. The fact that the stockholders 
of two corporations may be the same persons does not 
operate to destroy the legal entity of both corpora-
tions. 
CLAUDE N E O N LIGHT INC. V. FEDERAL ELEC-
TRIC COMPANY INC. 236 NYS 692. Holds that a corpo-
ration formed by two others to do what neither could or 
would do without the other cannot be disregarded as a sep-
arate entity. 
To the same effect is a CORSICANA NATIONAL 
BANK OF CORSICANA V. JOHNSON, 251 US 68, 64 
LED 141, where it was held that a national bank and a loan 
company doing things the bank could not do maintain their 
separate identity. 
H . E. BRIGGS A N D COMPANY V. HARPER CLAY 
PRODUCTS COMPANY, 150 WASH. 235, 272 P 962. The 
court held: 
"It is not enough to call for adjudicating two 
corporations to be in legal effect one, that it merely 
appears that one is owner of practically all of the stock 
of the other, and that they are very intimately related 
in jointly carrying on their business for the purposes 
of mutual benefit. It must also appear that their 
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property rights are so commingled and their affairs 
so intimately related in management as to render it 
apparent that they are, in fact and in interest, one, 
and to have them regarded otherwise would work 
fraud upon third persons." 
NICHOLS A N D COMPANY V. SECRETARY OF 
AGRICULTURE, 131 F. 2d 651. Here it was held that 
courts are hesitant to destroy the corporate separateness of 
parent and subsidiary where there is no evidence of evasion or 
where it is clear that both the parent and subsidiary have a 
legitimate separate existence. 
GINAS V. L O E W S INC. 75 NYS 2d, 421. Held that a 
subsidiary corporation is an entity independent and apart 
from its parent corporation and is not its alter ego. 
LEDLOW V. GOODYEAR TIRE A N D RUBBER 
COMPANY OF ALABAMA, 238 ALA. 35, 189 SO 78. The 
court held: 
"Affiliates of a corporation may have separate 
identity though both are wholly owned by dominant 
corporation, as where business of latter justifies crea-
tion of each to serve separate and distinct functions, 
as where each aspect of its business is of such propor-
tion and character as that it may be conducted to 
better advantage by separate corporations; and they 
each form essential features of a coordinated plan of 
operation, and have separate corps of employees and 
managers with separate facilities and arrangements, 
and there is no confusing relations to mislead the pub-
lic and no other fraudulent or evasive result is thereby 
accomplished. They are not then identified as one." 
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DUARTE V. POSTAL U N I O N LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 171 P 2d, 574. The court held: 
"Before the courts will disregard the corporate 
entity of one corporation and treat it as the alter ego 
of another, even though the latter may own all of the 
stock of the former, it must further appear that there 
is such a unity of interest and ownership that the in-
dividuality of the one corporation and the owner or 
owners of its stock has ceased, and further, that the 
observance of the fiction of separate existence would, 
under the circumstances sanction a fraud or promote 
injustice." 
In the light of the foregoing it is clear that Zions is not 
limited in its corporate powers and purposes to the corporate 
powers and purposes of this defendant, a corporation sole 
created under an entirely different and separate part of the 
code governing corporations. 
P O I N T EIGHT 
T H E COMPLAINT FAILS T O STATE A CAUSE 
OF ACTION BECAUSE IT FAILS T O ALLEGE FACTS 
SUFFICIENT T O SHOW A BREACH OF TRUST. 
Throughout his brief plaintiff repeats over and over 
again the idea that this defendant, and Zions, hold a trust 
fund and that this trust fund is being misused in the acquisi-
tion of a site for a federal building at First South Street. We 
feel we have demonstrated that there is no trust property in-
volved and that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts which 
would involve misuse of a trust fund. Assuming, however, 
that this defendant holds trust property, and that plaintiff 
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and intervenors have such an interest that will allow them to 
sue this defendant for breach of trust, there is no breach of 
trust alleged. 
All that is alleged is that (Paragraph 17) if the property 
is acquired by defendant Chamber of Commerce or Gus P. 
Backman, this, and the other defendants, plan to induce the 
General Service Administration to purchase the same for the 
erection of a federal building site thereon. It is then alleged 
(Paragraph 19) that under this plan it will be necessary for 
this defendant or Zions, to advance for the purchase price sev-
eral hundred thousand dollars to pay for such site in excess of 
the amount that will be received from the federal government 
for the site so furnished. In Paragraph 20 (b) it is alleged this 
defendant nor Zions has any right to use trust funds held by 
them to pay for a site for a federal building. 
Under its articles of incorporation the objects to be ac-
complished by this corporation are defined as follows: 
"Second: The object of this corporation shall be 
to acquire, hold and dispose of such real and personal 
property as may be conveyed to or acquired by said 
corporation for the benefit of the members of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a re-
ligious society, for the benefit of religion, for works of 
charity and for public worship. Such real and per-
sonal property may be situated, either within the State 
of Utah, or elsewhere, and this corporation shall have 
power, without any authority or authorization from 
the members of said Church or religious society, to 
grant, sell, convey, rent, mortgage, exchange, or 
otherwise dispose of any part or all of such property." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
This clearly indicates that it can acquire, hold and dis-
pose of property for four separate purposes, namely: 
1. For the benefit of the members of the Church, a re-
ligious society, which clearly indicates an entity separate and 
distinct from this corporation. 
2. For the benefit of religion. 
3. For works of Charity. 
4. For purpose of worship. 
The "works of charity," so authorized, need not be con-
fined to Church members but may take any desired form 
within the meaning of these words. These are generic terms 
and must be given their usual meaning. The Church, over the 
years, has made contributions to all kinds of enterprises that 
are not restricted to its members. Its contributions to the fed-
eral government, during World War I, of a vast quantity of 
wheat, its donations to flood and disaster areas, its donations 
to the United Funds and to the Boy Scouts of America are 
classic illustrations. 
According to Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Vol-
ume 2, Section 368, charitable purposes include: 
" (a ) Relief of poverty, (b) The advancement 
of education, (c) the advancement of religion, (d) 
The promotion of health, (e) Governmental or mu-
nicipal purposes, (f) Other purposes, the accomplish-
ment of which is beneficial to the community." 
In Section 373, Restatement continues: 
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"A trust for the erection or maintenance of pub-
lic buildings, bridges, streets, highways, parks or other 
public works or for other governmental or municipal 
purposes is charitable." See comment (a) . 
A lengthy discussion of the definition of charitable pur-
poses or trusts is found in 12 ALR 2d at Page 855. As stated 
in IN RE H A R T S ESTATE, 151 Cal App. 2d 271, 311 P 
2d 605: 
"Gifts in aid of governmental purposes are uni-
formly held to be for charitable purposes." 
See also SCOTT O N TRUSTS, 2d Edition, 1956, Page 
2665. 
This court in STAINES V. BURTON, 17 Utah 331, 
53P 1015, followed this same rule and quoted Lord Camden's 
definition of a charitable gift as "a gift to a general public 
use, which extends to the poor as well as the rich." See also 
10 Am. Jur., Page 585, Section 3, and 10 Am. Jur., Page 647, 
Section 79, where it is stated that gifts to the government for 
its general benefit or for the reduction of the state or national 
debt are valid as charitable gifts. See also 50 ALR, Page 593-
598 and cases therein cited. 
The motive of the donor is immaterial, 10 Am. Jur., 
Page 594, Section 13; Restatement of Law of Trusts, Vol-
ume 2, Section 368, Comment (d) . 
There need not be a necessity for the charity sought to 
be established, 10 Am. Jur., Page 593, Section 12. The court 
will not inquire into the necessities. WILSON V. FIRST 
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NATIONAL BANK, 164 Iowa 402, 145 N ¥ 948, Ann. 
Cas. 1916 D 481. 
The Church, from its very beginning, has fostered and 
given financial support to all kinds of public endeavors. It has 
fostered and promoted many industries calculated to benefit 
non-members as well as members. For this it has a world wide 
reputation, not limiting its efforts in that regard to any par-
ticular area. 
The Church, through its members, settled this valley, 
formed and built Salt Lake City, the recognized capital of its 
religious and welfare activities. The church is profoundly in-
terested, and rightly so, in beautifying and improving its 
capital city. Because of the Church, and its far reaching ac-
tivities and reputation, millions of people visit Salt Lake City. 
It has become one of the great tourist attractions of the 
nation. 
Certainly the Church is deeply concerned and interested 
in Salt Lake City having governmental facilities worthy of 
its capital city. Certainly it is rightfully interested in seeing 
that the eye sores that now house the public safety depart-
ments of its capital city be replaced and new facilities ac-
quired, with a new modern federal building rising to replace 
these obsolescent and inadequate facilities. Certainly it is 
within the term "works of charity," as above defined, to 
bring about such a result. Any money spent to accomplish 
that objective can not by any stretch of the imagination be 
termed a breach of trust. It is for the benefit, not only of 
Church members, but all of the citizens of Salt Lake City and 
the State of Utah. 
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Assuming, therefore, that there is a trust and that funds 
of such trust will be used to assist in accomplishing the above 
result, there is no breach of trust. The action of this defend-
ant in so using its funds is still within the powers enumerated 
in its articles of incorporation and is within the purposes for 
which it holds its funds. 
P O I N T N I N E 
T H E TRIAL C O U R T DID N O T ERR I N DISMISS-
ING T H E SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS T O THIS 
DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiff, in his second cause of action, adopts Para-
graph 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the first cause of action. Paragraph 1 
alleges that he was a tithe payer and a contributor to the 
Church and has an interest in the trust fund held by Zions 
and this defendant. In Paragraph 3 he alleges the corporate 
existence of this defendant. In Paragraph 7 he alleges the pur-
poses of this defendant is to hold and disburse real and 
personal property for the benefit of the members of the 
Church, a religious society, for the benefit of religion, works 
of charity and purpose of worship. 
There are no allegations in the second cause of action 
that involve this defendant in violation of a trust relationship 
or in any excess of corporate power or in any activity of any 
kind except it entered into a contract with Salt Lake City to 
buy the Forest Dale Golf Course. Accordingly, any allega-
tions concerning plaintiff's former membership, former pay-
ment of tithes and contributions and the existence of a trust 
fund held by this defendant and plaintiff's interest therein 
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are wholly immaterial and redundant and add nothing to the 
second cause of action. 
In final essence, this second cause of action is merely a 
taxpayers suit against the city for entering into a contract to 
sell the golf course because, first, all members of the city 
commission voting for the contract were members of the 
Church and so were disqualified from authorizing the con-
tract, and, second, the city did not give any notice, did not 
pass any valid authorization for the execution of said contract 
or to declare said property was no longer useful for use as a 
city park, or otherwise informing the citizens of Salt Lake 
City that said park would be sold and abandoned as a park. 
Plaintiff prays that the contract be declared null and void. It 
thus appears there are no allegations stating a claim upon 
which relief can be granted against this defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
From the plaintiff's complaint it is apparent that this 
action is designed not to protect the public's interest in either 
the preservation of public property or in the selection of a 
public site for a federal building, but to serve some other pur-
pose. The matter of the obsolesence of the police, fire and 
health department properties were fully and openly aired in a 
public hearing to which anyone could, and was invited to, be 
heard. Evidence was taken, experts were consulted, commit-
tees of citizens made recommendations, all to the effect that 
Salt Lake City was in urgent need of new facilities for its 
public safety departments. Plaintiff and intervenors were 
conspicuous by their absence. They now seek to litigate that 
which has been laid finally at rest by the very tribunal whose 
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sole jurisdiction it was to decide the matter, the city commis-
sion. There are no allegations of fraud, chicanery, capricious-
ness or other illegal aspects. Plaintiff simply denies that these 
properties are in fact sufficiently obsolete for the purposes 
for which they are used. That issue can not be re-hashed in an 
action such as plaintiff has brought. The court has no juris-
diction to substitute its discretion for that of the city com-
mission in a matter of this kind. 
The purchase of the Forest Dale Golf Course was widely 
publicized to provide a junior college site to be sponsored by 
the Church. The purchase price was paid and the funds de-
rived therefrom were spent by the city in acquiring and 
improving a new golf course. More than a year passed before 
plaintiff brought his action to question that sale. He is guilty 
of laches. 
No one having any standing in the Church has ques-
tioned the participation of the Church, whatever it may be, 
in the two transactions. Plaintiff's solicitation for the Church 
membership in his attempt to protect them from what he 
considers an unauthorized use of Church funds, is touching 
but of no legal efficacy. He has no interest. He has no stand-
ing in his self-appointed role of watchdog over Church funds. 
To permit him, or his companions, the intervenors, in their 
undisclosed purpose, to delve into the Church financial ac-
tivities, its internal polity and to cast appersions upon its 
integrity and purposes, under the specious and wholly in-
adequate allegations of plaintiff's complaint would not in 
any manner promote justice or protect public interest, but 
would in fact do just the reverse. 
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We respectfully submit that no cause of action has been 
alleged against this defendant. The judgment of dismissal 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Homer Holmgren 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondents, 
Corporation of the President of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
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